The United Nations and the Use of Private Military Contractors

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS

 

Author: Mordu Serry-Kamal, Ph.D.

 

Introduction

The United Nations, the post-World War II international confederation, has recently made the decision to embrace private military contractors for the purpose of providing effective protection for its staff who operate in volatile areas of the world such as Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.[1] This administrative strategy or ploy constitutes a major deviation from the organization’s long-standing standard operating procedure pertaining to the non-use of military contractors toward the fulfillment of its global peacekeeping responsibilities. As a matter of fact, the contemplated idea in the 1990’s of the use of such contractors to protect refugees in the eastern part of the then Zaire, following the ethnic purges in neighboring Rwanda, was said to have been dismissed as too costly and politically inadvisable.[2] Since resources are always scarce relative to the demand for them, the organization’s expressed concern over the issue of costs is thoroughly understandable. Additionally, since the United Nations is a confederacy that purports to represent the global interests of sovereign entities for peace and stability, the concern as to whether or not such military contractors will conduct themselves on the basis of a pattern of shared values with the United Nations is also understandable. Therefore, given the above statements, it can be seen that these two considerations had constituted a clear manifestation of the fact that the organization has always been aware of the underlying difficulties that are associated with any attempt to adopt military contractors into its operations.

 

Therefore, if this venture had been abandoned outright, on a cost-benefit analysis basis as indicated above, why has the United Nations suddenly decided to reverse itself by embracing this form of public administration in global peacekeeping; and, what might the long-term global implications likely to become for the world body? This brief exercise will attempt to address the question above by providing the reasons underlying the organization’s sudden decision; and, assessing the impact of such a decision on the organization as a global confederation.

 

Analyses

Even though the organization has advanced a number of reasons for embarking on this venture, none of them appears to have addressed the twin issues of costs and benefits adequately.  Samples of the posited reasons follow: [3]

 

• Since the organization has lost several of its staff to terrorist attacks in the past, this ploy will ensure some measure of security for organizational staff.
• Host countries have demonstrated that they cannot be relied upon to provide the needed security for staff members.
• The strategy will enable the organization “to continue operating in an increasingly hostile environment”.

In assessing the sample of reasons stated above, one can discern two distinct features: One, the organization has not determined exactly what it will cost to secure these contractors and whether states may be inclined to keep making financial contributions toward the sustenance of such a program, within the parameters of a seemingly endless war on terrorism. Two, the idea that the military contractors will be able to provide effective security for United Nations personnel is strictly speculative, since each contractor will be conducting its operations independently through the use of its own personnel management system, the values of which may or may not be in concert with those of the United Nations as an organization. Therefore, if the very significant public administration issues of costs and benefits have not apparently featured prominently into the organization’s decision-making pertaining to private military contracting, then one might speculate that the organization’s decision has been made largely on the basis of “organizational survival” rather than on the basis of any scientific reasoning pertaining to public personnel administration.

 

Additionally, this behavior appears to reflect some significant measure of confusion within the decision-making apparatus of the organization. Such confusion may have been engendered by the negative public image of the organization in various parts of the world; especially the third world, where economic depravity has contributed greatly in generating conflicts among vying political factions. For example, there is widespread speculation among some combatants in the countries already mentioned that the organization may be under the direct control of certain major global powers with vested interests in their respective countries. As a result, the organization is viewed as incapable of becoming a neutral arbiter in their domestic disputes, since such powers are suspected of using the organization to promote their foreign policies. Whether this is the case or not, such speculations have been known to fuel the persistent animosities directed against the organization when it attempts to fulfill its responsibilities in peacekeeping. Therefore for all practical purposes the organization itself has been viewed, by some factions, as combatants in the theater. This, therefore, explains the primary reason for attacks perpetrated against the organization’s personnel.

 

Further, since the United Nations has been unable, for whatever reasons, to shed its image of inequity in areas of conflicts it has been placed in a situation whereby it has no other choice but to continue to make itself consequential in the global arena by “remaining in business”. Remaining in business would therefore imply that the organization cannot afford to allow itself to be expelled from its vital global peacekeeping role by incessant attacks from combatants. In this regard two conclusions can be drawn: one, since the organization appears to have accepted the view that it could not satisfy the political aspirations of all the vying factions in any given conflict that rages in a particular country; and two, since it does not intend on allowing the existence of the world body to be threatened by being absent from global areas of conflicts as a result of attacks against its personnel, the organization has decided to abandon its long-cherished value of not absorbing private military contractors into its operations. It will do so simply to ensure its organizational survival.

 

Additionally, the United Nation’s inability to gain the trust of all vying factions in a conflict, as a neutral arbiter, would be tantamount to a contradiction in terms of what the international community expects the organization to represent as a global confederation in pursuit of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping will be impossible unless the all the warring factions have faith and confidence in the intentions of an organization which purports to promote peace. Most conflicts that emerge on the world stage consist of combatants with legitimate political grievances that have not been addressed equitably, and this is why they are fighting. But if one or more of these combatants envisage that the United Nations cannot be relied upon as an equitable and neutral arbiter, then the response to the presence of the organization will come in the form of attacks, kidnappings, and shootings. This explains the reasons for the continued attacks against the organization’s personnel which have led to the embracement of private military contractors.

 

Assessment

The embracement of private military contractors, as a form of strategic public personnel administration, may create difficulties for the organization in the long run. The factors, stipulated below, constitute some of these anticipated challenges.

 

• Accountability – This is defined as the process by which public officials answer to the citizens directly or indirectly for the use of their powers.[4] Since the private contractors will not be considered as “employees” of the United Nations and as a result can neither be disciplined nor terminated (except in cases in which the contract may not be renewed), how will the organization hold them accountable for their actions in a theater of rampant violence?
• Responsibility – If the private contractors engage in a conflict that may bring about “collateral damage” (the mistaken deaths of innocent civilians, for example), will the contractors accept responsibility for their actions and pay restitution to the affected people or will the United Nations accept responsibility on their behalf? What impact will such situations have on the image of the United Nations?  
• Effectiveness – This is defined as the degree to which a program fulfills the goals defined by policymakers.[5] If the private contractors succeed in the goal of protecting the United Nations personnel effectively, regardless of the “ruthless” methods employed in the process, how will the organization respond to this type of situation? For example, will the organization renew the contract of that concern because it has been successful in achieving the set goal? If this should transpire, how will the organization defend its image within the international community as an entity that grants contracts to ruthless and uncontrollable private military concerns?
• Costs – How will the organization ensure that the private contractors will not impose financial charges over and above actual services rendered?

 

Conclusion

By contemplating the granting of contracts to private security firms, the United Nations should prepare itself for a plethora of difficulties in that pending relationship. In this regard, the organization may be advised to learn from the imbroglio involving the activities of the former Blackwater/USA security firm, in Iraq.

 

Since the organization cannot afford to lose its mediating credibility in the global arena, the author reasons that the proper channel would be the development of a model that addresses the issue of getting states to cooperate toward the fulfillment of peace missions throughout the world. The United Nations cannot be regarded as a force for peace if vying political factions continue to visualize it as unfair in its quest to address the myriad of problems confronted by countries.

 

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[1] Colum Lynch, “U.N. Embraces Private Military Contractors”, Foreign Policy FP, January 19, 2010 http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts 

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] William C. Johnson, Public Administration: Policy, Politics, and Practice, Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., Connecticut, 1992, page 532.

[5] Ibid, page 533.

The Concept of the Globalization of Public Administration in Disaster Relief: The Case of Haiti

Introduction

The print and electronic media have been supersaturated with information pertaining to the calamities surrounding the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that occurred in Haiti on January 12th, 2010. This type of frenzied coverage of natural disasters, especially, has been commonplace in United States media circles. For example, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami which plagued certain countries in Asia; and Hurricane Katrina, which plagued the Gulf Coast area of the United States in 2005, have all been covered in about the same journalistic vein. In this regard, the mass media succeeded in bringing the plight of these affected places into the international forum for observation, discussion and analyses. In the case of the Haitian earthquake, this exposure has set the stage for countries within the international system to make the attempt at mustering the needed resources designed to assist Haiti, not only effectively address the short-term impact of the earthquake, but also to emerge from the ruins of that catastrophe in the long run. In as much as such efforts are helpful in providing some measure of relief for the affected populations of that state, history has shown that they are nevertheless usually fraught with tremendous political (the actual provision of resources), and logistical (coordination) difficulties both of which in turn contribute extensively to operational delays and as a result the apparent ineffectiveness of the goals espoused by such missions.

For all intents and purposes, this international effort is tantamount to a globalization of public administration, defined as the “attempt” by other state governments, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) to assume the governmental functions of another state, perhaps temporarily, in an effort to govern the affairs of that state. However, because there are inherent political and practical problems of the provision of adequate resources, in addition to very acute problems of the coordination or the logistics of relief efforts, achieving the goal of effective disaster relief has been demonstrated to be extremely difficult. In this exercise the view will be espoused that, as a result of the political and coordination difficulties encountered, the globalization of public administration in disaster relief efforts such as the one in Haiti will largely be ineffective. This difficulty is further highlighted by a comparison between Katrina and the Haitian earthquake experiences.

 Comparative Analyses: Katrina and the Haitian Earthquake

Although one disaster took place in an advanced country with a tremendous amount of resources and technological capabilities, while the other took place in a third world country that is widely regarded as a failed state, Katrina and the Haitian earthquake nevertheless share similarities and dissimilarities as it regards disaster relief efforts, from a public administration perspective.

(1) Generating the needed resources for the purpose of addressing effectively a catastrophic aftermath the magnitude of which had not been expected and as a result, for which there had been no concrete plan, proved to be extremely difficult even for the United States and rather practically impossible for the impoverished and fragile state of Haiti. This fragility explains the reason that Haiti, unlike the United States, has had no choice but to acquiesce to an international donor force, at the price of the loss of a significant measure of its sovereignty.

 (2) The coordination of the relief effort among donors, in the case of Haiti, and policy coordination among the three levels of government, in the case of the United States, also manifested extreme difficulties. In the United States, despite the stipulations in the federal constitution pertaining to the relations that govern the two levels of government under federalism, all three jurisdictions (the National Government, Louisiana, and New Orleans) held each other culpable as to which level was supposed to have been responsible for performing certain functions in addressing the aftermath of that catastrophe. This is proof that disaster relief efforts, without regard to where they may occur, will be challenging undertakings for political and/or coordination reasons. These difficulties are compounded when the international status of Haiti is observed from two major perspectives: first, that Haiti is an impoverished society; and second, that the coordination of relief efforts was made much more complicated by the involvement of states world-wide in a globalization of public administration effort.

The Globalization of Public Administration: A General Theory

Because the globalization of public administration exacerbates the issues of resource availability and coordination, a number of positions are being posited in the form of a general theory. (1) That the long-term effectiveness of the globalization of public administration in disaster relief efforts, whether man-made or nature-made, is actually unattainable. Resources will be inadequate and relief efforts may not be coordinated effectively. (2) That any measure of success by such efforts will be temporary at best (a band aid) and will not necessarily, serve the long-term needs or interests of the populations in that particular state or country. The state would not have possessed the infrastructure that would enable it to address such problems on its own. (3) That the “disempowered” (unable to resolve its own domestic problems) state will continue to need such assistance in the future, thereby placing in jeopardy its sovereignty within the international system, and also placing a strain on the scarce resources of donor countries. Because the state will continue to be very dependent on foreign assistance, foreign donors will be returning to provide aid on a repeated basis. (4) That allowing disempowered states to remain disempowered, and as a result absolutely dependent on other states for the welfare of their populations, may cause serious disturbances within the international system of continued political competition among donor states; and even wars, if such problems are to become really intractable.

POLITICS OF THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Addressed below are a number of reasons which are responsible for the politicization of the provision of resources to a country that may be in need of them. The reasons are rooted in economic and political theories as regard the behavior of states or the “games nations play” within the international system.

 Global Competition

There is competition among some donor countries whose primary goal may simply be the creation of a “sphere of influence” or hegemony in that particular state, for the fulfillment of their own national political, economic and/or security interests. Because the world is decentralized (no world government), international relations are rife with this type of tacit “deal-making”, implying that such donor countries may have an ulterior motive other than the articulated humanitarian gesture. When this becomes the case, the emphasis is shifted away from humanitarianism to a quid pro quo strategy which may have the effect of diluting that type of aid, or making it somewhat ineffective or unappreciated once the recipient state discovers that there are strings attached to it. Further, it is also possible that when state “A” discovers that it has successfully “out-bidded” (given more aid) than its competitor state “B”, it may then decide to end its allocations having satisfied perhaps one of its own national interests (the “out-bidding” of competitors), even though more aid may still be needed by the recipient state, and even though state “A” may still have more resources at its disposal. To elaborate, a number of examples involving the relief efforts in Haiti will be enunciated.

Scarce Resources

Since economics teaches that resources are scarce relative to the demand for them, the decision-making process as to “who gets what when and how”, according to Harold Lasswell, will be conducted on a political basis rather than on the basis of actual need. David Easton agreed with this assessment when he defined politics as “the authoritative allocation of values or scarce resources”. For example, donor states often decide to allocate scarce resources to countries primarily on the basis of a vital national interest. Any other condition such as, where the national interests are either too minimal or simply non-existent, may not be considered seriously. The rational basis of this principle is premised on costs and benefits, whereby “returns” are expected for the donor country’s “investments” in order that the effort be regarded as having been tantamount to rational decision-making. In colloquial terms, a potential donor state will aspire, as individuals do in societies, to “put its money where its mouth is” in the international system.

 Further, this phenomenon can be appreciated when one observes the ideological composition of the list of countries and organizations that are involved in the Haitian earthquake relief efforts. Primarily, the countries consist of allies, enemies, and non-aligned states. The non-aligned states are themselves not absolutely non-aligned, since some are dependent on other states, occasionally, for assistance. Even some of the NGO’s, sometimes regarded as not having any ideological orientation, are said to actually be representatives of their respective state governments and/or multinational corporations. Multinational corporations have also been known to have vested interests in other states.

 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION

After having examined the politics underlying decision-making in international resource allocation, the technical issue of coordination will also be examined in terms of the practical problems posed in international relief efforts.

 Because of the limitations imposed by political considerations, as has already been demonstrated above, it will simply be impossible to assemble donor countries, whose national interests are at variance with each other, to agree to coordinate their functions for the purpose of increased effectiveness in relief efforts.

 Another major obstacle, even under the assumption that coordination could have been possible, is the differences in the personnel systems of the states that are involved in the process. It may be possible, in a typical country, to assemble firefighters from various local jurisdictions to train them in anticipation of a terrorist attack, as has been done in parts of the United States. But, how can such a complicated enterprise be conducted at the international realm where there is decentralization? The United Nations could have been, perhaps, the most ideal organization to conduct such an initiative, but the organizational membership still consists of the same states that seek their individual national interests within the international arena. This makes the United Nations somewhat ineffective; especially, when it is considered that the permanent members the Security Council are global hegemons within the international system, each with its own vested interests. Most of the organization’s funding emanates from these major powers, with the United States at the top. This would imply that, as an organization, the United Nations may not be able to promulgate policies that run counter to the vested interests of the permanent states in the National Security Council, without the agreement of such states. To some extent, this explains the reasons international disaster relief efforts have been so handicapped.

 Conclusion

What should be done in the case of Haiti to help it be more self-sustaining into the distant future? This becomes a valid question because it has been very clear for decades that the state is unable to sustain its sovereign status in the international community. In the United States President Clinton, certain members of Congress, and former bureaucrats in the national government, have all attempted to address this issue. But has not this same issue been addressed in the past?

 Since it is not possible to engage in effective global public administration, the only other approach to take is to empower Haiti so that it may be able to maintain its sovereignty in the western hemisphere. Among other positive factors, this will assist greatly in stabilizing the region, a concern of the United States for over one hundred years.

 

By:  Mordu Serry-Kamal, Ph.D.