Let’s not Forget the Haitian Children

There is no single day that I don’t wish to go to earthquake-hit Haiti and serve those homeless and helpless orphan children who are living an impoverish life under an open sky with an almost empty stomach and seeking emotional aid from strangers as they strive to overcome the dilemma of living alone. Haiti is now crowded with international aid agencies, emergency hospitals, doctors, nurses and a world of people who are volunteering their valuable time to reach out to those who are left with nothing but a shocking memory of the past. This past is almost a month old, but recovering from it seems like a life-long process for those who are greatly affected by the devastating earthquake. They now get startled by a leaf spiraling down from a tree. These victims of nature, especially the orphan children need to be nurtured with a long-term recovery plan. Only a family and home, can heal the psyche of these Haitian children.

Kudos to this high-tech media age which presents real stories of these vulnerable children and inspire us to behave like a responsible global citizen to rebuild its future on the rubble of its past. But what will happen to these children when the media leaves, when Anderson Cooper leaves?  Will Haitian children fade away from our memory?

No questions asked to anyone entering and exiting the country in this chaotic moment when relief efforts are at its peak hour. In other words, it is almost impossible to discern who is truly interested in adopting the orphans and who the child traffickers are. UNICEF reports indicated that children have been missing from hospitals and community centers and it gets worse with the news when the Idaho group was found involved in taking  a busload of children out to the Dominican Republic illegally. Groups like UNICEF and Save the Children put a halt in the adoption process to prevent possible smuggling of children out of the country. Even an independent committee like Joint Council of International Children services is formed to create a standard procedure so those who really want to adopt are bound by legal obligation. Probably this is the right time to identify the loopholes of the whole adoption process before it goes out of control threatening the well-being of the innocents.

Before the earthquake, there were about 380,000 children living in orphanages across Haiti, and now the number is close to 600,000. No one is sure as to what will happen to these children. Not all of them will have a home, not everyone will be lucky to receive parental love and motherly care once again. The question of legality, a major concern, to save the children from the hands of traffickers requires most attention, but more important is to find a right match for these children. I am not advocating for adoption biases based on races. What I am saying is that these children are already orphans and unless authority undertakes a detailed understanding of the new adopter’s capacity to take over this innocent’s life there is every possibility for them to become orphans for the second time.  It is better to remain in the waiting list for them than to be cheated with love.

Fear of child traffickers and requirements like background checks may take a whole lot of time now than expected. Caught in this waiting dilemma, the authority must not deny these children from opportunities like education. Time heals everything and it will heal the intolerable pains of being orphans too. But refusing their rights of education and economic opportunities would be a grave mistake for the ones who are now responsible to determine the fate of these children. Be it a year or two, or more than that, the international community must not turn their back from these children. Putting bandages or digging graves is not the end of this show. It is like a movement to help these children by developing a long-term recovery plan that will take account of economic, emotional, and educational aspects of each orphan’s well-being.  Media might take off, but human spirit must not fade away from Port-au-Prince.

Reefa Mahboob, M.P.A

Mapping Haiti

On Tuesday, January 12th, I heard the same news as everyone else in the world: a horrendous earthquake – 7.0 in magnitude – struck less than ten miles from the city of Port-au-Prince, Haiti.  I felt the need to do something beyond donating money – something that would have a meaningful effect for people; something that would save lives.   My husband, a nurse and former search and rescue professional, was constantly being asked if he was planning to travel to Haiti to assist with rescue efforts.  In contrast, I felt less than useless.

It was hard to listen to the news of the devastation in Haiti, and know that my skills wouldn’t be needed until the rescue was done, and even then, there are a lot of people out there with more practical public administration skills that would help more than mine would.  I struggled to think of a way that I could be useful.  I couldn’t possibly imagine what I could do from 1,500 miles away. 

I received an email from my agency director, a few days after the earthquake. The email outlined some ways that people from our agency could assist efforts in Haiti, including Doctors without Borders, the Red Cross, etc.  At the end of the email was a link to Crisis Commons, looking for people with technical skills to meet on an appointed Saturday for an all day session of “civic hacking”.  They were looking for people with all kinds of technical skills, including telecommunications, networking, and yes, mapping skills.

Along with other like-minded technical professionals, I spent the day at “Crisis Camp” mapping roads, buildings, and other features that would help rescue organizations like the Fairfax County Urban Search & Rescue Team (USA-1) navigate through areas that were damaged or otherwise inaccessible.  Along with 20+ other people at our particular event, and many people around the world, I continued the process of building an open source map of Haiti using Open Street Map.  (According to some sources, there are no complete, current maps of Haiti, aside from some old maps that the CIA created at least 20 years ago.  This is the first effort of this kind, possibly ever.)

The Crisis Camp was much more than just mapping.  There were people building language translating applications, helping develop a wi-fi network in Haiti, and many other extremely technical projects.  It was amazing to me to see all of these technology wizards, project managers, and other interested folk working together to accomplish feats that would take years and many millions of dollars in the “regular” world.  There have been two other Crisis Camps in DC (that I know of), many others across the U.S. and internationally, and more events to come.

I feel good about my efforts with Crisis Commons.  I have done something useful that has meaning beyond this single event.  I have learned some new technical skills, and gained experience with a technology/tool that will have an impact on other similar efforts,and in my regular work. Out of tragedy comes action and education.  I could not ask for a better way to make a difference in the world.

Crisis Commons

Open Street Map Project

After the dust settles…the aftermath of Haiti

As a Public Administration practitioner, I know for a fact that my PA colleagues have been watching the news and stories of the relief efforts in Haiti and shaking their heads.  It’s natural.  As employees in the public sector, this is what we do; we develop, plan, implement, lead, assess, evaluate and revise.  This is definitely what we do.

I personally kept stating that there is a need for a logistics team to lead the efforts because of all of the bottlenecking and missed efforts that are over compensated.  However, as I have moved along from the current relief and on-going search efforts, my concern is with the aftermath.

We have seen it before, after the dust settles and nothing more can be done “on the ground” the efforts turn towards rebuilding.  However, I have found that some of the very entities that need assistance are often forgotten.  For instance, homes, schools and government buildings will become priority of course and rightfully so, but what about the small businesses and nonprofit organizations.

There are organizations that are in Haiti providing wonderful services; however, if you think about it they have been hit twice.  First, the organizations’ leaders, workers and volunteers have been hit individually in which they will have to recover, but then they will have to rebuild the organizations in which they work and regain stature so that they can begin to continue to provide much needed services.  This part is often forgotten.  The organizations that provide services to those in need are now in need themselves.

Although donating money is the big need right now, I feel that I am not doing enough.  The question for me is, what can I do to assist those organizations that are in need after the dust settles?  As a practitioner along with my colleagues, we should be able to come up with an answer to this question.  We are public administrators.  We should be able to propose a solution.  I am seeking answers and action.  What do you think?

Vanessa S. O’Neal PhD Candidate

Founder:  Families 4 Life, Inc.

http://www.families4lifeinc.org

The Concept of the Globalization of Public Administration in Disaster Relief: The Case of Haiti

Introduction

The print and electronic media have been supersaturated with information pertaining to the calamities surrounding the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that occurred in Haiti on January 12th, 2010. This type of frenzied coverage of natural disasters, especially, has been commonplace in United States media circles. For example, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami which plagued certain countries in Asia; and Hurricane Katrina, which plagued the Gulf Coast area of the United States in 2005, have all been covered in about the same journalistic vein. In this regard, the mass media succeeded in bringing the plight of these affected places into the international forum for observation, discussion and analyses. In the case of the Haitian earthquake, this exposure has set the stage for countries within the international system to make the attempt at mustering the needed resources designed to assist Haiti, not only effectively address the short-term impact of the earthquake, but also to emerge from the ruins of that catastrophe in the long run. In as much as such efforts are helpful in providing some measure of relief for the affected populations of that state, history has shown that they are nevertheless usually fraught with tremendous political (the actual provision of resources), and logistical (coordination) difficulties both of which in turn contribute extensively to operational delays and as a result the apparent ineffectiveness of the goals espoused by such missions.

For all intents and purposes, this international effort is tantamount to a globalization of public administration, defined as the “attempt” by other state governments, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) to assume the governmental functions of another state, perhaps temporarily, in an effort to govern the affairs of that state. However, because there are inherent political and practical problems of the provision of adequate resources, in addition to very acute problems of the coordination or the logistics of relief efforts, achieving the goal of effective disaster relief has been demonstrated to be extremely difficult. In this exercise the view will be espoused that, as a result of the political and coordination difficulties encountered, the globalization of public administration in disaster relief efforts such as the one in Haiti will largely be ineffective. This difficulty is further highlighted by a comparison between Katrina and the Haitian earthquake experiences.

 Comparative Analyses: Katrina and the Haitian Earthquake

Although one disaster took place in an advanced country with a tremendous amount of resources and technological capabilities, while the other took place in a third world country that is widely regarded as a failed state, Katrina and the Haitian earthquake nevertheless share similarities and dissimilarities as it regards disaster relief efforts, from a public administration perspective.

(1) Generating the needed resources for the purpose of addressing effectively a catastrophic aftermath the magnitude of which had not been expected and as a result, for which there had been no concrete plan, proved to be extremely difficult even for the United States and rather practically impossible for the impoverished and fragile state of Haiti. This fragility explains the reason that Haiti, unlike the United States, has had no choice but to acquiesce to an international donor force, at the price of the loss of a significant measure of its sovereignty.

 (2) The coordination of the relief effort among donors, in the case of Haiti, and policy coordination among the three levels of government, in the case of the United States, also manifested extreme difficulties. In the United States, despite the stipulations in the federal constitution pertaining to the relations that govern the two levels of government under federalism, all three jurisdictions (the National Government, Louisiana, and New Orleans) held each other culpable as to which level was supposed to have been responsible for performing certain functions in addressing the aftermath of that catastrophe. This is proof that disaster relief efforts, without regard to where they may occur, will be challenging undertakings for political and/or coordination reasons. These difficulties are compounded when the international status of Haiti is observed from two major perspectives: first, that Haiti is an impoverished society; and second, that the coordination of relief efforts was made much more complicated by the involvement of states world-wide in a globalization of public administration effort.

The Globalization of Public Administration: A General Theory

Because the globalization of public administration exacerbates the issues of resource availability and coordination, a number of positions are being posited in the form of a general theory. (1) That the long-term effectiveness of the globalization of public administration in disaster relief efforts, whether man-made or nature-made, is actually unattainable. Resources will be inadequate and relief efforts may not be coordinated effectively. (2) That any measure of success by such efforts will be temporary at best (a band aid) and will not necessarily, serve the long-term needs or interests of the populations in that particular state or country. The state would not have possessed the infrastructure that would enable it to address such problems on its own. (3) That the “disempowered” (unable to resolve its own domestic problems) state will continue to need such assistance in the future, thereby placing in jeopardy its sovereignty within the international system, and also placing a strain on the scarce resources of donor countries. Because the state will continue to be very dependent on foreign assistance, foreign donors will be returning to provide aid on a repeated basis. (4) That allowing disempowered states to remain disempowered, and as a result absolutely dependent on other states for the welfare of their populations, may cause serious disturbances within the international system of continued political competition among donor states; and even wars, if such problems are to become really intractable.

POLITICS OF THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Addressed below are a number of reasons which are responsible for the politicization of the provision of resources to a country that may be in need of them. The reasons are rooted in economic and political theories as regard the behavior of states or the “games nations play” within the international system.

 Global Competition

There is competition among some donor countries whose primary goal may simply be the creation of a “sphere of influence” or hegemony in that particular state, for the fulfillment of their own national political, economic and/or security interests. Because the world is decentralized (no world government), international relations are rife with this type of tacit “deal-making”, implying that such donor countries may have an ulterior motive other than the articulated humanitarian gesture. When this becomes the case, the emphasis is shifted away from humanitarianism to a quid pro quo strategy which may have the effect of diluting that type of aid, or making it somewhat ineffective or unappreciated once the recipient state discovers that there are strings attached to it. Further, it is also possible that when state “A” discovers that it has successfully “out-bidded” (given more aid) than its competitor state “B”, it may then decide to end its allocations having satisfied perhaps one of its own national interests (the “out-bidding” of competitors), even though more aid may still be needed by the recipient state, and even though state “A” may still have more resources at its disposal. To elaborate, a number of examples involving the relief efforts in Haiti will be enunciated.

Scarce Resources

Since economics teaches that resources are scarce relative to the demand for them, the decision-making process as to “who gets what when and how”, according to Harold Lasswell, will be conducted on a political basis rather than on the basis of actual need. David Easton agreed with this assessment when he defined politics as “the authoritative allocation of values or scarce resources”. For example, donor states often decide to allocate scarce resources to countries primarily on the basis of a vital national interest. Any other condition such as, where the national interests are either too minimal or simply non-existent, may not be considered seriously. The rational basis of this principle is premised on costs and benefits, whereby “returns” are expected for the donor country’s “investments” in order that the effort be regarded as having been tantamount to rational decision-making. In colloquial terms, a potential donor state will aspire, as individuals do in societies, to “put its money where its mouth is” in the international system.

 Further, this phenomenon can be appreciated when one observes the ideological composition of the list of countries and organizations that are involved in the Haitian earthquake relief efforts. Primarily, the countries consist of allies, enemies, and non-aligned states. The non-aligned states are themselves not absolutely non-aligned, since some are dependent on other states, occasionally, for assistance. Even some of the NGO’s, sometimes regarded as not having any ideological orientation, are said to actually be representatives of their respective state governments and/or multinational corporations. Multinational corporations have also been known to have vested interests in other states.

 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION

After having examined the politics underlying decision-making in international resource allocation, the technical issue of coordination will also be examined in terms of the practical problems posed in international relief efforts.

 Because of the limitations imposed by political considerations, as has already been demonstrated above, it will simply be impossible to assemble donor countries, whose national interests are at variance with each other, to agree to coordinate their functions for the purpose of increased effectiveness in relief efforts.

 Another major obstacle, even under the assumption that coordination could have been possible, is the differences in the personnel systems of the states that are involved in the process. It may be possible, in a typical country, to assemble firefighters from various local jurisdictions to train them in anticipation of a terrorist attack, as has been done in parts of the United States. But, how can such a complicated enterprise be conducted at the international realm where there is decentralization? The United Nations could have been, perhaps, the most ideal organization to conduct such an initiative, but the organizational membership still consists of the same states that seek their individual national interests within the international arena. This makes the United Nations somewhat ineffective; especially, when it is considered that the permanent members the Security Council are global hegemons within the international system, each with its own vested interests. Most of the organization’s funding emanates from these major powers, with the United States at the top. This would imply that, as an organization, the United Nations may not be able to promulgate policies that run counter to the vested interests of the permanent states in the National Security Council, without the agreement of such states. To some extent, this explains the reasons international disaster relief efforts have been so handicapped.

 Conclusion

What should be done in the case of Haiti to help it be more self-sustaining into the distant future? This becomes a valid question because it has been very clear for decades that the state is unable to sustain its sovereign status in the international community. In the United States President Clinton, certain members of Congress, and former bureaucrats in the national government, have all attempted to address this issue. But has not this same issue been addressed in the past?

 Since it is not possible to engage in effective global public administration, the only other approach to take is to empower Haiti so that it may be able to maintain its sovereignty in the western hemisphere. Among other positive factors, this will assist greatly in stabilizing the region, a concern of the United States for over one hundred years.

 

By:  Mordu Serry-Kamal, Ph.D.

Haiti and Emergency Management

Members of ASPA’s Section on Emergency and Crisis Management have been following Hurricane Katrina and trying to understand the limitations of disaster response, and what might be done to get help to victims and survivors faster.

Haiti now adds another layer of study for us. What factors are present in a disaster requiring international aid? How can these avoided becoming barriers to needed assistance?

The Section will sponsor a session on Haiti in April at the annual conference in San Jose where section members and ASPA members can have an open conversation on this public administration challenge for 2010 and beyond!

Disasters requiring international aid have occured with distressing frequency in the recent past. The January 2010 Natural Hazards Observer just featured a pair of invited comments on international aid, reflecting on Cyclone Nargis, and in one George Kent leads off with the challenge of the hour: “The rights and obligations of different parties in humanitarian assistance need to be clarified.”

Bruce Binder, long time Veterans Administration emergency manager, FEMA disaster responder and EIIP Board member, just circulated a document on Friday, January22 showing that the Red Cross tried to bring the Unified Command structure to bear on Haiti, to no avail. In my own recent article in Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management, I raise some of the concerns with the delivery of cross-border aid, especially international challenges.

The day of the earthquake the President of Haiti said that his home and his palace had both collapsed, and that he had no place to sleep, “but I have plenty of time to look for a bed.” Since then the airport has become the defacto seat of government, while coordination of aid operations seems limited to the US government assets - mainly military and DHS- as they provide air traffic control and airport logistics management. The US military reports on using GPS to track US assets in the field, but who is coordinating the multi-national relief efforts going on all over the disaster area?

The New York Times’ daily photos show fear and shock changing to anger, with pre-disaster gang activity again on the rise. The UN and its Brazilian peacekeepers, present before the earthquake, became disaster victims along with the Haitians they were trying to protect.

Does the US have a special responsibility as a neighbor? As a hemisphere leader through OAS? What should be expected of the Dominican Republic? Of other Carribbean neighbors? Should the UN and International Red Cross be the lead agencies? Who is responsible once life safety issues (e.g. rescue and immediate medical care) have been addressed? Will the nation’s central government be able to provide any command and control functions?

The total national disaster is a new disaster model that will need some new strategies.  While the southeast Asian tsunami and Cyclone Nargis were devastating, the national capitals were spared and national government functions continued. In Haiti the capital was the site of  the worst of the shaking, taking down ministry buildings with their public servants inside. How does the loss of a country’s trained administrators impact its ability to respond to and recover from such devastation?

On Friday, January 22, the second week after the earthquake, 500,000 Port-au-Prince residents were being evacuated from the carnage and wreckage to tent cities outside the urban area. While this may be good from a public health perspective, what are the mental health impacts of the loss of community and sense of place? How will people cope with their grief in a new environment without the succor of long time neighbors and parish priest?

Another question is where will the money come from to rebuild a  country, where one third of the population is victim/survivor? Government facilities are gone. The port is gone. The airport has one usable runway. The water and sewer plants, hospitals, schools and churches are all damaged or destroyed in the quake area. Lacking building codes, the built environment has crumbled, and now has become a second layer of disaster: debris management.

We can give  money to the Red Cross or Unicef. We can engage in prayer or whatever religious or philosophical activities we believe will help. We, however, are not just concerned by-standers, but public administrators. What can we give of ourselves, our knowledge, our capability to ensure that such a disaster is not repeated in Haiti? That is the real challenge to ASPA.

Frannie Edwards, past chair (2006-2009), SECM